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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CITIZENS CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.GEORGE L. HACKETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case
No.10334

BRIEF O,F APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover insurance premiums
which plaintiff claimed defendant collected and did not
remit.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
The matter was tried before the Court without jury,
the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson presiding, on September 29, 1964. The Court rendered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment December 16, 1964,
in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $4,671.96 plus
interest from July 29, 1959 (R. 10-16).
]

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, at the outset of the trial, moved the
Court to consolidate this case and two companion cases
currently pending before the same Court involviug the
same parties, the same type of insurance coverages and,
in the companion cases, naming two additional would-be
insureds (R. 32). At the time of that argument, counsel for defendant also moved the Court to dismiss this
action on the grounds that the same issues of law in this
action had been adjudicated by a decision of the Third
District Court, Hon. l\Icnill C. Faux presiding, in the
companion case, Civil No. 127263, constituting res judicata. This motion does not appear in the transcript because the reporter did not report the same but indicates
"argument on motion" (R. 32). Counsel for defendant also, at that time, made reference to the pre-trial
order which reference is in part reported but not in its
entirety (R. 32). The gist of argument of counsel for
defendant relative to the pre-trial order was that the
undersigned, Gordon A. Madsen, was not present at the
pre-trial contrary to the language thereof; that he had
not been retained by the defendant, Hackett, to represent him in this matter until after the pre-trial; and
that, in fact, the defendant, Hackett, himself had contacted the pre-trial judge to give him the undersigned's
name as counsel.

The undersigned specifically, at the

outset of the trial, in connection with the argument that
the law had been determined in the companion case as
noted above, reserved as an issue the question of whether
or not plaintiff corporation was authorized to write the
2
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alleged insurance coverage in the State of Utah. The
Court then indicated it would take the motions under advisement and was pressed by counsel for the defendant
for an immediate ruling, or in the alternative for leave
to file an Interlocutory Appeal. The motions were then
denied, and trial commenced (R. 32 and 33). These motions were renewed at the conclusion of the evidence and
again denied (R. 177-8).
Following the trial and the rendering of the decision
by the Court as above noted, counsel for defense moved to
Alter and Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment and moved for a New Trial (R. 1721), again in the motions raising the defense, among othPrs, of res judicata (R. 20). Said motions were denied
by the Court (R. 22). From the orders of the Court at
the trial, the Judgment, and the Order denying defendant's motions for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend
defi>ndant appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by plaintiff-respondent, a
New York corporation engaged in the insurance business,
before the Third Judicial District Court to compel the
defendant-appellant to remit to the plaintiff premiums
for alleged long-haul trucking casualty risks of one Nielson Trucking Company in the amount of $9,155.20. Plaintiff alleges that these sums were collected by defendant
and, as plaintiff's agent, defendant should have remitte<l
the same to plaintiff (R. 1 and 2). Defendant denied

generally all of the material allegations of plaintiff's
Complaint and specifically denied that plaintiff was authorized to engage in the insurance business in the Statr
of Utah (R. 3).
Some time in October, 1958, the defendant agreed to
place all insurance needs for Nielson Trucking Company requested by its president, Paul W. Nielson (R.
35, R. 94 and 95). Defendant, Mr. Hackett was an insurance broker writing all kinds of casualty and life insurance under the corporate name and style of G. L. Hackett and Company (R. 94). Nielson required, among other
insurance coverages, public liability and property damage on his fleet of trucks which he operated in several
western states (R. 35 and 36, R. 95). Defendant, having
received the order from Nielson, attempted to place this
coverage ·with plaintiff company and contacted their ge11eral agent, Mr. Robert Blum, met with him in Los Angeles October 24, 1958, and in a three-party telephone conversation with Blum, defendant and a Mr. R. E. Bishop,
assistant secretary in the home office of plaintiff corporation, plaintiff agreed to write the coverage "pending
the receipt of a completed signed application on the part
of Nielson Trucking Co. for their review and consideration." (R. 95-96) Considerable testimony was elicited
about whether or not the plaintiff company issued "binders'' at this time. Some of such testimony will be specifically ref erred to in the body of the argument of this
Brief.
Defendant received a deposit premium of $1,000.00
from Nielson on October 3, 1958, (Exhibit P-1; R. 40)
4

an cl defendant wrote other coverages for Nielson relating primarily to cargo liability, to bonds, etc. (Exhibits
P-6, D-7, P-12; R. 37, 65, 70, 85). Considerable discussion and correspondence was had between the def endant and plaintiff's agent, Blum, regarding plaintiff's
wonld-be coverage which will be treated in detail hereafh•r (Exhibit D-19; P-15). A document purporting to
he a policy of insurance, dated April 6, 1959, was at last
delivered by plaintiff April 7, 1959 (Exhibit P-17). Plaintiff cancelled the policy the same date, April 7, 1959 (Exhibit P-16). The notice of cancellation was dated Marcp.
6, 1959, so plaintiff gave notice of intent to cancel the
coverage some one month prior to the delivery of the
policy. Defendant thereafter placed coverage, effectiv~
May 1, 1959, with Central Casualty Insurance Company
(Exhibit P-12; R. 100).
Nielson Trucking Company in 1960 went into involuntary receivership and Exhibit P-12, which constitutes
a running ledger of Nielson Trucking's account with
G. L. Hackett and Company, shows a balance due and
O\\'ing by Nielson in the amount of $3,285.75, for which
defendant made a claim in the receivership (Exhibit
P-13). While Exhibit P-12 shows all coverages, bonds,
etr., written for Nielson, the peculiar type of coverage
claimed to have been underwritten by the plaintiff and
actually subsequently carried by Central Casualty insurance Co~pany were to have a premium rate computed on a formula derived from the gross receipts
reported by Nielson. These gross receipt reports were,
during the course of defendant's dealings with Nielson,

often tardy, sometimes as much as four months late. Th~
premiums paid by Nielson were also delinquent and
sometimes said premium payment checks were not hon.
ored at the bank and needed re-processing (Exhibit D-1;
R. 49, 74-5). These payments were unsegregated or un.
itemized, and were tendered to pay on coverages needed
by Nielson (excepting some bonds) computed by Nielson
on gross receipts (R. 72, 76, 65-6).
While there was considerable testimony introduced
relative to plaintiff's premium rate, other coverages with
Fireman's Fund and other insurers,etc., defendant-appellant maintains that the above constitutes a summary
of the pertinent facts and will ref er to such other testimony as is incidentally necessary in the course of its
argument hereafter.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS
(A) ON THE GROUNDS OF RES JUDI·
CATA
The pertinent law, appellant maintains, on this issue
has been adopted by this court in the following cases:
Kmght v. Flat Top Mimng Company (1957) 6 Utah

2d 51, 305 Pac. 2d 503. In that case this Court, in an
6
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opinion written by Justice Wade, adopted Section 178,
30 Am. J ur., page 920, as follows:

"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions which
were in issue in a former action, and were there
admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein,
and that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take
in the subsequent action. • • • ''
In the later decision of In Re the Town of West
Jordan (1958) 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 Pac. 2d 105, 106, the
Court cites additionally and adopts as law 30 Am. Jur.,
Judgments, Section 363:
''A final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies,
and as to them constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, and cause of action. If, however, the two
suits do not involve the same claim, and cause d
action, such effect will not be ordinarily given to
the prior judgment. In this respect, it is worthy
of notice that there must be not only identity of
subject matter, but also of the <'ause of action, so
that a judgment in a former aetion does not operate as a bar to a subsequent action where the
cause of action is not the same, although each
action relates to the same subject matter: • • "~'
In the same connection this Court held in the case of
East Millcreek Water Company, et al. v. Salt Lake City
7

(1945 ), 108 Utah 315, 159 Pac. 2d 863, 866: [and more
recently repeated in the cases of vVheadon v. Pearson
(1962), 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 Pac. 2d 946, 947, with emphasis supplied as follows:]

'' * * * there are two kinds of cases where thr
doctrine of res judicata is appliPd: In the one tlie
former action is an absolute bar to the maintrnance of the second; it usually bars the successful party as well as the loser; it must be hetwrcn
the same parties or their privi2s; it applies nnl
only to points and issues which are actuallu raisr1
and derided therein but also to such as cn11ld have
been therein adjudicated, but it only applies ·where
the claim, demand or cause of action is the same
in both cases. In such case the courts holn that
the parties should litigate their entire claim, drmand and cause of action, and every part, iss11~
and ground thereof and, if one of the parties fail~
to raise any point or issue or to litigate any part
of his claim, demand or cause of action and the
matter .~(oes to final jrnlgment, such party may not
a~ain litigate that claim, (lemarnl or cause of action or an>-· i:;;sue, point or part thNcnf "-hirh he
could ha,·e hnt failed to litigate in the formr•r
acti(ln. On the other ha11d where tlw e1aim, 1lt'mand or carn;e of action is <liffrr0nt in th0 hrn
cases then tlic• formE>r is res jmlirata of fhe htt·.'!'
onl~.- to the extent that the former nctuall>-· rai:;;ed
and decided the same points and issues which arr
raised in the latter." (Cases cited)
The appe1lant herein maintains that a prior and
companion case involving the same two litigants had
reached a final judgment in District Court resolving the
pertinent issues of fact before the Court here and such
judgment did, in fact, therefore, constitute res judicata.

8

The case to which appellant makes reference and the pertinent extracts therefrom which appellant wishes this
Court to take judicial notice of pursuant to Section
78-25-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is Citizens Casualty C omp(11)1,y of New York v. Keith J. Coons and George
Hackett, Third District Court, Civil No.127263. That case
went to trial January 15, 1962, Judge Merrill C. Faux presiding. Following the trial the Court entered its Finrlings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on the
17th of April, 1962. The Court there found in Findings
9, 10 and 11 as follows :
"!1. PJaintiff contended that a binder was issued by plaintiff. But there was no evidence of
such an insurance binder having been issued by
plaintiff, and it was not shown that plaintiff had
ever granted to defendant, George Hackett, authority to bind the plaintiff on insurance risks.

10. The polic~r in question was form No. 380
C-3-58. This form had never been filed with the
office of the Utah State Insurance Commissioner,
as required by 31-19-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
11. The purported insurance policy bore the
counter-signature of one R. E. Bishop, who is a
resident of the state of New York. It was stipulated by the parties that the said R. E. Bishop
has never been licensed in any capacity by the insurance Commissioner of the state of Utah."
In its Conclusions of Law the Court found:
'' 1. No contract of insurance ever became effective and plaintiff is not, therefore, entitled to
collect a premium.

3. Defendant, George L. Hackett, is entitled to
judgment against plaintiff; no cause of action."
Counsel for plaintiff in that action then filed a Motion for New Trial. Said Motion has never been argued
or disposed of and the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment therefore constitute a
binding and final adjudication in the matter.

Appellant wishes to point out here that not only were
the same parties before the Court in the Coons case, the :
same issues of law and fact were there presented with
two incidental exceptions:
1. Co-defendant, Keith J. Coons was also made a
party in the former action while the alleged insured in
this action was not named as a party defendant, and
2. The insurance policy form in the Coons case
was numbered 380 C-3-58, while the policy in this case
bears the form number of 582-1-56. Appellant further,
however, requests this Court to take judicial notice of
the certificate supplementally filed herein by the State Insurance Commissioner which indicates that neither of
pursuant to Section 78-25-1 (3) and in accordance with
the office of the State Insurance Commissioner. Appel·
lant requests this Court to take such notice of this pub·
lie record from the Insurance Commissioner's office both
pursuant to Section 78-25-1 (3) and in accordance with
its holding in American Fork Irrigation Company v.
Linke, (1951) 121 Utah 90, 239 Pac. 2d 188.
Appellant therefore contends that whether or not
the Coons case, this present case and a third action
10
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brought by the plaintiff against this defendant antl another co-defendant, could and should have been consolidated, the above cited law is determinative and the pertinent issues of fact that are controlling here had already
been finally adjudicated. As noted in the above Statement of Facts, defendant at the outset of the trial moved
to dismiss on this ground and it was reversable error
on the part of the Trial Court to deny said motion.
(B) ON THE JURISDICTIONAL GROUND
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO STANDING IN COURT.
Section 31-19-9 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows :
"(1) No insurance policy form, other than a
surety bond form or application form, where written application is required, or rider form, peraining thereto shall be issued, delivered, or used
unless it has been filed with and approved by the
commissioner.''
Appleman, in his extensive treatise on insurance law
and practice, Volume 19, Section 10531, with reference
to compliance by foreign insurers with regulatory statutes in the insurance field says the following:
"It has been held by a very substantial number of cases that a policy issued by an insurer
which has not been admitted to do business within
a state, or which is issued by it prior to receiving a certificate of authority, is absolutely void.
Such contracts have been considered unlawful.
And a similar result of unenforceability has attached to policies solicited or written by agents
who have not complied with the state laws.
11

''The better rule would seem to be that such
contracts are held void so far as the insurer is
concerned, and the courts will not permit the insurer to maintain an action based upon such an
unlawful contract .... '' pp. 218-219
'' ... No recovery can be had by an unlicensed
insurer upon premium notes, or for premiums,
dues, or assessments, even though the collection
of such assessment is sought by the company's
receiver. And a foreign insurer which was not
licensed but which was doing business within th~
state could not have a release of a trust deed
wrongfully made by its agent set aside.
''Such an insurer has also been denied the
right to recover upon the note or bond of a local
agent. Other cases, feeling this result a bit clrnstic, have reached a contrary result, particular]:'
where the only failure of the company ·was to
publish a periodical report. Of course, in a11y
event, the persons pa3Ting such premiums to the
agent ·would retain a right of action to recon'r
them hack, so tbe more drastic result would not
mean that the agent could pocket such preminms
with impunity." pp. 220-222.
''The weight of recent authority is to the rff ed that the iiisurance company cannot, itself, rely
either upon its own Jack of authority or violation
of law as a defense to an action upon an insnr·
ance contract, or upon a lack of authorit3T or Yiolation of law hv its agents. The courts are nnt
prone to penali~e an insured, ignorant of the co~
pany 's lack of authority, for the company's misconduct, or to deprive him of the protection for
which he has paid. Nor is such a policyholder considered to he in pari delicto with the company or
its agents.'' pp. 224-226
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The Texas case of Denton v. Ware, (1949) 228 S.W.
2d 867, 871 announced that view in the following langunge:
"It is true that, as the prerequisite to the
right to engage in the insurance business or the
right of foreign insurance companies to do business in this state, the statutes requiring charters
and permits must be complied with, but these
statutes are for the protection of the citizens of
the state who may deal with such companies. It
is also true that such companies and their agents
are subject to penalties if the statutes are violated
and it is generally held that they cannot enforce
collection of premiums by suit; but when they have
collected such premiums and delivered policies of
insurance, those insured under them are entitled
to recover on the policies in the event they incur
the losses against which they are insured." (Emphasis added)
See also Home Forum Ben. Order v. Jones, 20 Tex.
Civ. App. 68, 48 S.W. 219: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
GaTveston, H. & S. A. Railway Co., Tex. Com. App., 239

s.w.

919.

The South Carolina case of Ballentine v. Covington
(1918), 96 S.E. 92 is one where a foreign insurance company whose selling agent in South Carolina had failed to
comply with some qualifying insurance statutes, took
promissory notes as payments for premiums on a policy
written with the foreign insurance company. The Court
refused to permit collection on the promissory notes. The
opinion reads in part:
''The contract of insurance was made in violation of law, and this court ·will not lend its aid to

13

enforce a contract made in violation of law. The
object of the insurance statutes are not for revenue only, but to protect the public from fraud
and imposition and not to allow unfit and improper persons to solicit insurance for companies
whose solvency is doubtful and the persons insured are not getting the protection paid for. In
this case we will leave the parties where we find
them, and decline to enforce the contract.''
Also in accord is the Minnesota case of SeamMtS v.
Christian Brothers Mill Co., Minn. (1896), 66 Minn. 205,
68 N.W. 1065, 1066. In this case a receiver of an insolvent Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company sought to
recover premiums from a Minnesota corporation in a
Minnesota court. It was held that non-compliance with
Minnesota insurance statutes regulating insurers precluded recovery. The court said:
"But, as before stated, it depends on the laws
and public policy of such state whether or not it
will thus enforce the contract. The laws and public policy may be such as to destroy this comity
and prohibit such enforcement of the contract.
We are of the opinion that the laws and public
policy of this state in reference to the insuring of
property are of this character. The restrictions
in our statutes are so many, and the repressive
character of the legislation such, that we must
hold this to be the public policy of this state. This
seems also to be the character of the insurance
legislation in Iowa and Michigan, as appears ~y
the cases of Seamans v. Zimmerman (Iowa), o9
N.W. 290, and Seamans v. Temple Co. (Mich.),
63 N.W. 408, where this same receiver was defeated in attempts to collect unpaid premiu~s
from citizens of those states. . . Neither is this

14

decision in conflict with Ganser v. Insurance Co.,
34 Minn. 372, 25 N.W. 943, where it was held that
the insured can recover the loss even though the
insurer has not complied with the statutory requirements so as to be authorized to do business
in this state. The very object of these statutory
provisions is the protection of the insured, and
the parties are not in pari delicto. ''
The plaintiff herein, in its own Complaint, at paragraph 3, appears to admit that it did not have the authority to underwrite the coverage in question but affirmatively alleges
''The Utah Commissioner of Insurance did not
recognize the limited purpose for which the defendant was appointed, namely - for countersigning purposes and the plaintiff was obliged to support the coverage for the Nielsen Trucking Company (R. 1).
In view of the Coons case noted above and further in
view of plaintiff's failure to comply with Section 31-19-9
as evidenced by the certificate of the Insurance Commissioner supplementally filed herein, this plaintiff is not
entitled to use the Utah courts to collect its would-be
premiums.
POINT 2
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IN THAT
NO CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS EVER
CONSUMMATED GIVING RISE TO A CAUSE
OF ACTION.
On the issue of the existence of an insurance contract, plaintiff having called the defendant as his wit15

ness on direct examination, proposed the following questions and received the following answers:
'' Q. And in that connection did you contact
the Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, the Plaintiff in this action?
A. Contacting their general agent Mr. Rob.
ert Blum.
Q. And after contacting him did you receive am
communications like a telegram. or letter fro~
Citizens Casualty Company of New York?
A. I did.
Q. Will you produce those communications?
A. Yes.

Your Honor, I must have that in another file.
MR. MADSEN :

Here.

A. Thanks. No, I didn't issue the binders.
They would happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew to Los
Angeles and met with their general agent of
10-24-58. Mr. Blum and in a three-way conversation between him and with myself listening on
the line to Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office in
New York. Mr. Bishop as a resuJt of that telephone call, which I paid for, and the receipt of
which is right here, caused a wire to be sent to
our office in. Salt Lake City, saying that they would
bind the coverage pending receipt of the completed signed application on the part of Nielson
Trucking Co. for their review and consideration.
Q. I see. And did you send in that application!
A. Airmail, special delivery from Los Angeles,
yes, sir." (R. 95-6)

There was considerable discussion subsequently be·
tween plaintiff's representatives and defendant about

16

1d1ether plaintiff could take the coverage and if so, at
what premium, the first of these being as follows:
A. And after that application went in and
binders had been sent, then what did you do about
collecting premiums on that policy?
A. I didn't do anything about collecting premiums on that policy, because the company had
not advised us what their rate would be, but on
deposit of the rate that we had with Nielson pending receipt of the premium to be charged by company, we waited for their information on what
those rates would be and receipt of a policy. They
had to formulate the rates in New York. I had
nothing to do with that. (R. 96-7)
He was later asked about conversations had with
plaintiff or its officers, etc., in connection with arriving
at an agreeable premium and he responded that there
were ''many'' conversations.
'' Q. Did you have any other subsequent conversations with either Mr. Bishop or any agent
of the company in New York?

A. Many.

Q. And what were those conversations related to?
A. Why we hadn't received the policy, why we
hadn't had communication and why we hadn't
been advised what the rate was and when we
could expect the policy.
Q. Did you have any conversation or conversations with Mr. Blum?
A. I did." (R. 157-158)
17

Two letters were introduced, marked Exhibits
"P-15" (from Bishop) and "D-19" (from Blum), which
provided in their pertinent paragraphs respectively a8
follows:
"The only other item to be cleared is the Ne[].
son Trucking Company. This matter was held in
abeyanre pending a discussion with 1\fr. Blum because of the change in our reinsurance farilities
for the primary layer. Sinre this market has
evaporated it would be our intention to issue the
policy at the manual rate of approximately $4.84
and then permit your office time to replace the
coverage so that we could terminate our filings on
this account also. About all we could do is to reiterate the importance of clearing these matters
up promptly." (Exhibit "P-15")
"The Citizens have not yet produced this policy and I am becoming conrerned berause of thr
time lapse and the premium that is due. I havr
not heard further from them but I wonder if you
would be kind enough to photostat the old Mid.
Union policy and send it to me and I will send it
to them, ~sking one more time for them to issue
this rontract. I do not understand this situation
but needless to say, it upsets me. $15,000 pre·
miums with no policy become a matter of worry
and in my case, disgust." (Exhibit "P-19")
On cross-examination by his own rounscl, the following
exchange occurred.
By Mn. MADSEN:
Q. Did Citizens Casualty Compan~T ever send
vou a bill or a statement for this polic~T which \\'!IS
delivered April 7, 1959~
A. Never.
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Q. Either before or after the delivery of the
policy?
A. No.
Q. Well, the :first contact you had in the way
of billing for said policy is that which you received
from Mr. Nordby of Nielson Trucking after they
billed Nielson?
A. Yes. (R. 150)

Later in connection with the Bishop letter (Exhibit
P-15) :

Q. Was this the :first comment relating to rate
other than the agreed upon three dollar and some
rate that you had in your phone conversation as of
October previously?
A. Yes.
Q. And this letter as of February they're still
indicating some question in their mind as to what
rate, if any, they are going to charge ; is that
correct¥
A. Yes. (R. 160)

And further :

Q. Now, then, Mr. Hackett, have you - I believe you have already testified to this, but I am
not now sure. Did they ever, Citizens Casualty,
the Plaintiff here, ever submit a statement to you
as to what premiums you should be collecting on
this policy during any of this time period?
A. Never. (R. 161)
Finally:
'' Q. Then you say the policy in question was
in fact issued April 7th, 1959?
A. The 6th.
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Q. Had yon in fact notified Citizens of the can..
cellation of the policy?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. In what manner?
A. I called him long distance phone and told
them of the absence of any policy, in spiL, of om
repeated effects [efforts] to obtain this policy that
I had sought the aclYice of legal counsel a~ tn
what to do, because after all we had to produce
a policy and we hadn't yet had one and upon the
lawyer advising me, checking \vith the state, they
found in fact they could not issue such a policy,
they had never made their filings and that was the
reason why we hadn't received the policy.
Q. "\Vithout telling us what was said or not
were you in fact contacting the State Insurancr
Commissioner regarding this specific policy or
proposed coverage?

A. I was.
Q. Arnl is this what led to yonr phoning as yon
just related?
A. Y cs." (R. 160-61)

Moreover, the record is explicit on the question as to
whether or not the defen<lant was or had been acting as
plaintiff's agent. His testimon~' in that connection was
uncontroverted :
Q. Did they ever give you a contract in agency,
appointing you their agent?

A. No.
Q. ·vvere you acting as their agent or an inde·
pendent hroker as and when you made the cover·
age. When you talked to Mr. Blum were you act·
ing as agent in the sense of a general agent 1
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A. At the time I talked to Mr. Blum, I was
acting as independent broker. (R. 161-2)
In this area appellant maintains the applicable lflw
is found in 29 Am. Jur. 587 at Section 196 and reads as
follows:
"It is no doubt true, however, that where there
is simply an offer to insure, ·without acceptance, or
where anything is left open for future adjustment
as to amount or duration of risk, or as to premiums, no contract to insure exists. It must clearly appear that all the elements essential to a valid
contract are agreed upon. There must be an off er
m1d acceptance of a complete contract to insure."
(Emphasis added)
This vie"· ·was adopted in the recent California case of
Vyn v. N ortl11cest Casualty Co., et al. (1960, 301 Pac. 2d
869, 872. There, the court said:
"In Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
'.\[ o., 88 S.W. 2d 344, 346, the court said: 'WhHe a
contract of insurance has some features which distinguish it from an ordinary commercial ~ontract,
yet in general respects it is like any other eontract and is governed by the same rules.' 32 C. J.
p. 1091. It is essential to the making of a contract of insurance as it is to any other contract
that there be 'an agreement, or meeting- of the
minds of the parties' thereto. 32 C. J. p. 1095."
See also TT' estcrn Ass11r. Co. v. life.Al pin, 23 Ind. App.
220, 5!) N.E. 119, 77 Am. St. Rep. 423; Mallard Y. Hardware ludP.m. Ins. Co., (Tex. Civil App.) 216 S.W. 2d 263.
There was clearly, from the above testimony no
"meeting of minds'' between plaintiff and defendant on
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the essential element of premium to be charged. In thui
connection, the defendant testified that the monies received from Nielson were carried on two ledgers entitJ 0rJ
"note account" and "open account."
Q. And that your own books carried this account as an open account and a note account; ii
that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. But you applied all of those receipts on subsequent insurance or concurrent insurance then
in force; is that correct?
A. Yes. (R. 163)
And again:

Q. And in that instance you did not so answer, but your testimony today is that those funds '
as they were received were kept in open account
and applied on insurance coverages you wrote
for Nielson Trucking Company?
A. Yes.
Q. Less your commissions~
A. Yes. (R. 164)
There being no agency expressly granted to defendant as noted above and there being no finalized contract
of insurance ever consummated, plaintiff has no cause
of action on which to base a suit for premiums and the
Trial Court erred in :finding to the contrary.
POINT 3
DURING THE PERIOD IN ISSUE THERE '
WAS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING ANY LOSS I
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SUSTAINED, CLAIM MADE OR BENE],IT
PAID UNDER THE WOULD-BE POLICY AND
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS A LIABILITY TO REFUND THE PREMIUM TO THE
WOULD-BE INSURED RATHER THAN rrHE
PLAINTIFF.
An annotation found at 29 A.L.R. 2d 171 collects the
rather numerous cases dealing with the liability of an
insurance agent to the insured with respect to procurement, contents, terms and coverages of insurance policies.
At pages 203 and 204, in the annotation, the cases relative to damages are collected and indicate that where in
fact the would-be insured suffers no loss or makes no
claim pursuant to the supposed policy, the insured's
damages are limited to the premium paid. This view is
adopted in Am. J ur. at 29 Am. J ur. Insurance, page 562,
paragraph 163, as follows :
''As to the measure of liability of an insurance
agent or broker for his f aiure to procure insurance, where a loss is suffered by the intending insured, the rule is that the damages should be equal
to the amount that would have been due under
the policy provided it had been obtained. However, where no loss occurs, the measure of damages is the amount palid as the premium." (Emphasis added)
Our own insurance code adopts this view at Section 31-19-24 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
am.ended:
''No person shall willfully or negligently fail to
return to the person entitled thereto, within a reasonable length of time, any sum collected as pre23

mium for insurance in excess of the amount actually spent for insurance applicable to the subject
on account of which the premium was collected."
(Emphasis added)
The record is absent any evidence showing that any
loss was sustained during the purported time period of
October, 1958, to April, 1959, that plaintiff claims coverage was extended. It was equally absent any evidenre
of claims made by Nielson Trucking Company pursuant
to any policy of insurance.
The record is, on the other hand, clear that Nielson
retained defendant to obtain and keep in effect all insurance coverages needed by Nielson, and defendant
so attempted to do. In fact, the record discloses that all
monies received by defendant from Nielson Trucking
Company were in fact ultimately applied on insurance
coverages with companies other than the plaintiff.
Q. And that in fact as the coverage continued
and the relationship with Nielson continued, these
coverages were paid for and all of the money rrceived from you was in fact applied on insnrance
coverage?

A. Right.
Q. Based upon policies which were in fact in
effect?
A. Yes.
Q. All others than Citizens Casualty?
A. Yes. (R. 166)
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Counsel for plaintiff on re-direct examination further
inquired into the matter as follows:

Q. If Your Honor will indulge me just a moment - Are you holding any funds in trust for
the Plaintiff as a result of the issuance of this
policy, Mr. Hackett?
A. No.
Q. Would you tell us what disposition was made
of the funds you collected from Mr. Neilson?
A. They apply as set forth in the letter.
Q. In other words, the funds that were paid on
the policy of the Citizens Casualty Company, you
applied on the policy of the Central Casualty
Company?
A. Right. (R. 176)

As noted in the Statement of Facts above, at the termination of defendant's dealings with Nielson Trucking
Compau>' tlefendant had in fact expended some $3,000.00
more on insurance coverage than Nielson paid for and
was compelled to file a claim for said amount with the
receiver of Nielson Trucking Company.

In summary, the plaintiff in this action arrived at a
premium purportedly due it by inference. That is, it
sought to show (A) the total money paid by Nielson to
defendant, (B) to estimate the premium allocable to
other coverages in force during the time period in question, and (C) to demand that the balance of A minus B
was due the plaintiff as its "earned premium." There
is no evidence in the record showing any computation on
the part of plaintiff of its proposed rate or premium due
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or earned other than Exhbit "P-15" quoted in Point 2
above, wherein plaintiff's officer quoted a figure rather
tentatively. Considered in view of the law cited above
not only does the defendant not have a duty to remit
anything to plaintiff but likewise, pursuant to the statute
above quoted, has a liability to refund to Nielson any
premium paid which did not purchase insurance cover·
ages. Appellant, of course, maintains that all premiums
paid by Nielson did purchase insurance coverages as the
testimony above indicates. But, for the purpose of
argument of this point, it wishes to illustrate that dur.
ing the time period defendant attempted to get cover·
age by the plaintiff, defendant himself was personally
and considerably exposed by way of liability to Nielson.
That is, had Nielson experienced a loss, having turned
all of his insurance matters over to the defendant, Niel·
son could have held defendant personally responsible and
plaintiff, of course, could have claimed no policy in force
since none had been delivered and since a premium had
never been agreed upon. Now, however, there being no
loss, no risk or no claim made, plaintiff is a J ohnny-com.e·
lately wishing in this action to obtain would-be premiums
having never assumed any actual risk.

POINT 4
THE ALLEGED BINDER WAS INVALID
BECAUSE NO POLICY WAS DELIVERED
WITHIN 150 DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE
DATE.
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Section 31-19-21 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, provides :
''No binder shall be valid beyond the issuance
of the policy as to which it was given or beyond
150 days from its effective date, whichever period
is shorter.''
Exhibit "P-17," the alleged policy in question,
shows on its face that notwithstanding it was to be a
12-month policy, it covers a period from October 27th,
1958, to April 7th, 1959, and it also shows on its face
that it was counter-signed at Salt Lake City, April 6th,
1959, by one R. E. Bishop. (As noted heretofore, l\fr.
Bishop is not a qualified resident agent for plaintiff company and did not, in fact, sign the document in Salt Lake
City.) Simple arithmetic shows that the effective date,
being October 27th, 1958, is 162 days from the issuance
date of the policy April 6th, 1959.
Accordingly, whatever binder, if any, plaintiff may
have issued, the same became ineffective or expired before any policy came into being.
POINT 5
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER SO NARROWLY AS TO
RELIEVE THE PLAINTIFF OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.
The Pre-Trial Order in this action (R. 5), which
appellant maintains is inconsistent on its face, states:
"At the time of pretrial it was stipulated that
the pleadings formed the issues in this matter.
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The sole issue is whether or not the def endaut
has misappropriated certain moneys to which the
plaintiff claims it is entitled to.'' (R. 5)
As noted heretofore, the undersigned first entered
an appearance on behalf of the defendant at the time 6f
trial, notwithstanding language in the Pre-Trial Order
that the undersigned was present at the Pre-Trial; and,
as also indicated heretofore, the undersigned, at the outset of the trial, referred to the inconsistency of said PreTrial Order and moved that the issues in fact be broadened sufficiently to include all those raised by the pleadings. The Trial Court, however, as indicated by the
Memorandum Decision and later by the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, restricted the trial
to one issue as follows :

'' 1. That the plaintiff is an insurance corporation of the State of New York and has a Certificate
of Authority from the State of Utah to transact
within the State of Utah the business of property,
marine and transportation and general casualty,
excepting glass and surety insurance; that the
Pretrial Order did not make any issue as to plaintiff's authority to transact insurance business in
the State of Utah; that the sole issue stated in
the Pretrial Order is whether or not the def end·
ant has misappropriated monies to which the
plaintiff claims it is entitled to." (R. 10)
By so narrowly construing the issue the Court therefore assumed that an agency existed between defendant
and plaintiff. It further assumed that plaintiff had the
authority to underwrite the coverage in question in the
State of Utah. And it further apparently ass11mPd to
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be true the allegations of paragraph 3 of the Complaint
wherein plaintiff complains that sanctions were imposed
on it by the Utah Insurance Commission compelling it
to assume such coverage. All of these matters were e.xpressly denied by the Answer and, in fact, formed as
issues by the pleadings.

While Exhibit "P-14" indicates that some initial telegrams to the Utah Public Service Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission, reputed to be binders, were
sent in October, 1958, by plaintiff, there is no evidence of
any dealings by the plaintiff with the Staie Insurance
Commissioner. Such narrow construction by the Court
Q>f the issues obviously constituted prejudicial error in
that all the issues above noted were expressly raised by
defendant's Answer and properly, therefore, framed by
the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
Defendant-appellant, for the foregoing reasons, does
therefore respectfully move that this Court reverse the
Judgment of the court below and remand the case with
instructions that the same be dismissed or that, in the
alternative, a new trial be had.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON A. MADSEN
MABEY, RoNNOW, MADSEN

& MARSDEN

57 4 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-·
Appellant
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